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ABSTRACT
Edge computing draws a lot of recent research interests be-
cause of the performance improvement by offloading many
workloads from the remote data center to nearby edge nodes.
Nonetheless, one open challenge of this emerging paradigm
lies in the potential security issues on edge nodes and end
devices, e.g., sensors and controllers. This paper proposes
a cooperative protocol, namely DEAN, across edge nodes
to prevent data manipulation, and to allow fair data shar-
ing with quick recovery under resource constraints of lim-
ited storage, computing, and network capacity. Specifically,
DEAN leverages a parallel mechanism equipped with three
independent core components, effectively achieving low re-
source consumption while allowing secured parallel block
processing on edge nodes. We have implemented a system
prototype based on DEAN and experimentally verified its ef-
fectiveness with a comparison with three popular blockchain
implementations: Ethereum, Parity, and Hyperledger Fabric.
Experimental results show that the system prototype exhibits
high resilience to arbitrary failures: the percentile of trusty
nodes is much higher than the required 50% in most cases.
Performance-wise, DEAN-based blockchain implementation
outperforms the state-of-the-art blockchain systems with up
to 25× higher throughput and 18× lower latency on 1,000
nodes.
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Edge computing [1] offers an efficient means to process col-
lected data (e.g., through sensors and other end devices) at
nearby edge nodes as opposed to transferring data back to
remote data centers, e.g., cloud computing. Obviously, edge
computing saves the network traffic and improves the appli-
cation performance, particularly for those latency-sensitive
applications such as virtual reality [2]. Nevertheless, edge
computing brings several new technical challenges includ-
ing security and privacy concerns with edge nodes and sen-
sors [3]. The root cause of these new concerns lies on the
fact that most security techniques used in data centers and
cloud computing [4–6] are hardly applicable directly to the
edge nodes and sensors. We highlight two outstanding dis-
crepancies between cloud computing and edge computing
in the following.
• System Infrastructure.The edge nodes and end de-
vices constitute a loosely-coupled distributed system
of highly heterogeneous participants with wireless
connections. For instance, edge computing nodes
range from smart phones toworkstationsmostly con-
nected through wireless networking such as WiFi
and ZigBee, whilst cloud computing data centers
comprise racks of on-premises homogeneous blade-
servers interconnected with high-speed network in-
frastructures.
• Resource Constraints. The edge nodes and end
devices such as sensors are equipped with many con-
strained resources in terms of CPU, memory, storage,
network, and power. Therefore, many assumptions
well-accepted in data centers do not hold in edge
computing. As a case in point, a typical sensor only
has about 10-100 MBmemory compared with tens of
gigabytes of memory available on the blade-servers
in data centers. Other resource constraints in edge
computing include but not limited to: no or small
storage capacity, battery power, to name a few.
Due to the openness and resource-constraint security
mechanisms of edge computing systems, various security in-
cidents were repeatedly reported. One notable incident was
that a Jeep SUV was remotely hijacked through its UCon-
nect’s cellular connection [7]. In addition, mobile devices are
vulnerable to malicious applications to a large degree [8],
e.g., the users install applications from untrusty third-party
sources [9].
One plausible approach to tackle the security challenge
in edge computing is to encrypt the edge data with stronger
mechanisms such as public key infrastructure (PKI) [10]. Un-
fortunately, the computing capability of edge sensors is lim-
ited; even if they can carry out the encryption (of every single
message), the power consumption is prohibitive as they are
mostly battery-powered [11]. While a single node can hardly
protect the data, the following approaches are based on the
cooperation between multiple nodes. In dependable systems,
there are a vast of studies derived from Paxos [12] and Prac-
tical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [13].
Both Paxos and PBFT require a lot of message passing,
likely saturating the bandwidth of edge node’s wireless net-
work fairly quick. One notable variant is based on full repli-
cation: each node stores a replica of the data initiated by the
leader and the integrity is guaranteed as long as no more
than 50% of nodes are compromised. This approach requires
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less communication and instead takes more storage space.
Of note, the last approach reflects the design philosophy of
public blockchains (Bitcoin [14] being, arguably, the most
successful application). Nonetheless, an existing blockchain
cannot be directly applied to an edge network: blockchains
(or shards thereof) require all participants (full nodes) to
store the entire history of the data provenance, which clearly
cannot be accommodated by most end devices. To summarize,
existing security and fault tolerance approaches pose unrealis-
tic expectations on compute, network, or storage in the context
of edge computing.
If we reexamine the aforementioned approaches to trust-
worthy edge computing, the blockchain-based approach
seems promising: storage or space constraints might be over-
come by leveraging software approaches such as compres-
sion and shallow replication. This is partly why various in-
dustries have recently spent much effort in investigating tak-
ing blockchain or its variants for their application-specific
needs. For instance, “with the advent of blockchain, decen-
tral[ized] data management can be implemented in a privacy-
preserving and efficient way,” recently stated car manufac-
turer BMW [15]. However, blockchain is considered more
like a blackbox in this case without clear solutions to existing
obstacles. To make it more specific: Although blockchain has
proven its high security in cryptocurrency, the consensus
protocols taken by all popular blockchains assume abundant
resources (in terms of computation, storage, and network) of
the system infrastructure. New consensus protocols must be
designed and tailored to the specific characteristics of edge
nodes and end devices.
1.2 Proposed Solution
This paper proposes a set of new blockchain protocols for
edge nodes (along with end devices) under resource con-
straints. We name the edge network powered by the new
protocol DEAN: Decentralized-Edge Autonomous Network,
as illustrated in Figure 1. The key idea of our decentralized
protocols is threefold: (i) leveraging the resources (i.e., per-
sistent space and computational power) available in the edge
nodes to ameliorate the pressure on the end devices (e.g.,
edge sensors); (ii) taking a very light-weight but reliable con-
sensus protocol to support scalability and fast processing
of client requests; and (iii) balancing the storage pressure
among edge nodes that enables fair sharing of the data. In
addition to the above requirements, the new protocol must
ensure, with provable guarantees, that the entire system’s
data integrity is not tampered with.
While our primary goal of exploiting energy-efficient con-
sensus protocol is to provide lightweight and space-efficient
security, one by-product of this design is the high perfor-
mance of the proposed protocol: In addition to the strong
data integrity, our experimental results show that the system
Figure 1: Proposed Four-Tier Edge Computing Archi-
tecture with DEAN.
prototype built upon DEAN outperforms major blockchain
systems (Ethereum [16], Parity [17], and Hyperledger Fab-
ric [18]) by orders of magnitude in terms of both throughput
and latency, which is attributed to the parallelism of block
processing in DEAN.
In summary, this paper makes the following contributions:
• We propose a lightweight consensus protocol (§3.3)
to adopt blockchains in edge computing that con-
sumes less energy and supports parallel block pro-
cessing, allowing us to scale the system out to thou-
sands of nodes while keeping low the latency of
processing clients’ requests.
• We propose a parallel data dissemination strategy
that not only maintains the equitable sharing of the
storage among the edge nodes but also provides the
capability of recovery and fast accesses to the data.
We also devise a mechanism for quick recovery of
missing blocks in case of edge node failures. (§3.3)
• We theoretically prove DEAN’s safety and liveness:
as long asmore than 50% nodes are not compromised,
the system as a whole remains intact and secure;
the protocol is not blocking the execution of the
application even some nodes fail silently. (§3.4 and
§3.5)
• We implemented the proposed protocol and opti-
mization for edge computingwith a blockchain frame-
work. The framework represents a full stack of the
blockchain system including large numbers of par-
ticipating nodes, encryption modules based on SHA-
256, distributed network queues, the DEAN consen-
sus protocols, and so forth. We carry out extensive
experiments to evaluate the strong security and high
efficiency of DEAN and compare them against state-
of-the-art blockchain systems. (§4)
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2 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND
CHALLENGES
The research question this paper thrives to answer is how to
extend existing blockchain technology for data trustworthiness
with limited resources in the unique infrastructure of edge
computing.
There are various challenges to be addressed. The system
infrastructure in edge computing is a completely different
story than that of workstations and cluster of servers: a
large portion of the system is comprised of sensors who
have limited computation power, negligible storage capac-
ity, and wireless network connections. Though the edge
nodes comparatively have more resources (i.e., computation
power, disk space, and bandwidth), it is still challenging to
deploy the traditional blockchain systems due to extensive
storage requirements and energy consumption. Ideally, the
blockchain crafted for edge computing should incur light-
weight resource usage both on the edge nodes and sensors
in terms of computation, storage, and networking.
It follows that neither conventional public blockchains
(high computation power) nor private blockchains (high
network traffic) meet our goal. Present protocols (e.g., proof-
of-work, proof-of-stake, practical byzantine fault tolerance,
or hybrid) do not offer a mechanism that provides a precise
balance among the reliability, computation, and storage re-
quirements while affords the scalability among the thousands
of node. The proof-of-stake appears to be suitable to apply
in edge computing as it offers low complexity of commu-
nication and computational work. However, due to several
reliability issues (e.g., nothing-at-stake, or Sybil attack due
to the possibility of initial stake procurement from the public
pool), it does not meet the requirements to apply directly
to the edge computing yet. To make it worse, all existing
blockchain paradigms, no matter public, private, or a vari-
ant/hybrid thereof, require an unrealistic storage capacity
on the nodes.
Although a recent work [19] focuses on the resource-
constrained blockchain system for edge computing at a small
scale that attempts to pre-compute which edge devices will
store the block before traditional a proof-of-stake supported
mining process starts. This pre-computation of block al-
location takes a significant portion of block mining time.
Therefore, the work does not consider the quick query or
transaction processing issue, one of the critical parts of edge
computing. Precisely, the main deployment goal of the edge
devices is to help edge sensors to quickly process data so
that the dependency on the central server can be relaxed.
Another issue is, the approach solely depends on the tra-
ditional proof-of-stake consensus mechanism that enables
stakeholders to procure an initial token from a public pool
to participate in the mining process; hence, it still holds a
loop-hole in the design.
The goal of the proposed protocols presented in this paper
is to provide a low-complex and reliable consensus mecha-
nism tailored with a space-efficient data replication strategy
that quickly responds to a transaction request while capa-
ble enough to scale up to the thousands of nodes without
compromising the safety. To this end, we design new proto-
cols to allow blockchains work with (1) limited computation
power and network bandwidth and (2) relaxed storage re-
quirements.
2.1 Threat Model
We consider the worst case in which an internal adversary
has got authenticated to an edge node. With the authorized
access to the edge devices, the attacker may attempt to alter
or modify a transaction record, commit a false transaction
(i.e., fraud), perform a denial-of-service attack on other users
through an artificial escalation of security level, or even send
unauthenticated messages. To be more specific, we are inter-
ested to see if the internal adversary can compromise data
in 51% edge devices powered by the proposed mechanism.
Another crucial challenge in DEAN is forging of node at-
tributes (e.g., adjacency list, geographic location, or activity
timer, etc.) to achieve unfair share. Nodes can closely moni-
tor each other and check the attributes that are periodically
updated. The attribute table is shared with the majority (i.e.,
at least 51%) of the adjacent nodes through the Build-Network
process (i.e., Protocol 1). Therefore, any inconsistent oper-
ation will help the fellow nodes to identify the malicious
activities and eliminate the faulty nodes from the trusted
node list.
2.2 Resource Requirement of Blockchains
Blockchains have proven to be effectively dealingwith the ad-
versary attacks and drawn a great deal of research interests in
various communities such as security [20], networking [21],
and databases [22]. However, all existing blockchains assume
that there are total n heterogeneous nodes, each of which has
sufficient computation, storage, and networking capability.
For the sake of brevity, we use ci , si and pi to indicate the
aforementioned three types of resources in the i-th node ni ,
respectively. Specifically, literature assumes the following
constraints are satisfied when deploying a blockchain:
• ci serves two main objectives in blockchains. First,
in public blockchains1, ci competes in a computation-
intensive race2 to hopefully become the winner who
would be qualified to add a new block of transactions
to the chain. The race, for example, could be finding
1A public blockchain is open to everyone who can access the Internet.
2Also called a “mining” procedure and the node then becomes a “miner”.
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out a specific integer such that its hash value (us-
ing the given hash function) satisfies some specific
properties. The incentive for the nodes to join the
competition is two-fold: (i) Thewinner receives some
rewards from the blockchain itself. At the writing
of this paper, every new block is awarded with 12.5
bitcoins in the Bitcoin network, and the price of one
bitcoin is higher than $10,000 USD in the exchange
market; (ii) The winner also receives some transac-
tion fee from the users who request the transaction.
As such, many nodes are equipped with high-end
GPUs to accelerate their competitiveness in the race.
Second, in all blockchains, ci verifies multiple hash
values, notably the hash value of the previous block
and the hash value of the current block body stored
at the block header. Due to limited space, we point
the readers who are interested in more details of
blockchains a recent survey paper [23]. Compared
with the race computation, the verification takes
much less, usually negligible, computation power.
• si stores the entire history of transaction since the
inception of the network. The current Bitcoin net-
work, for example, requires each node to store more
than 100 GB data locally. The I/O performance and
storage capacity are usually not the bottleneck of
the blockchain system, especially with the continu-
ously dropping price of high-performance persistent
storage such as SSDs and NVMs.
• pi provides a port by which the blocks and messages
are routed between the nodes. In public blockchains,
the new block in the synchronization procedure does
not incur much traffic due to the fact that main-
stream blockchains do not deliver a high throughput
of transactions (e.g., one block every 10 minutes in
Bitcoin network, one block every 10-15 seconds in
Ethereum, in contrast to hundreds or thousands of
transactions per second in databases). The network
is usually not the bottleneck in public blockchains.
However, in private blockchains3 whose consensus
largely depends on fault-tolerance protocols like
Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) [13], the
large number of messages can easily saturate the
bandwidth of the network [24].
In summary, blockchains deployed to conventional system
infrastructure, usually high-end workstations and cluster
of servers, do not experience much pressure on the stor-
age capability, but are limited by either computation (public
blockchains) or networking (private blockchains). Storage,
however, becomes edge computing’s top technical barrier
before it can leverage blockchains. DEAN is designed in such
3A private blockchain is open to only authenticated users.
a way that these resource requirements are relaxed without
compromised security.
3 DECENTRALIZED-EDGE
AUTONOMOUS NETWORK
3.1 The Blockchain System Model
In this section, we elaborate on the design of the proposed
blockchain system. We first introduce some essential terms
and components. Then, we present an overview of three
core components of the DEAN protocol that work in parallel.
Finally, we explain the protocol workflow in detail.
Nodes. Our proposed system consists of two types of
nodes, along with the central data center: (i) edge nodes (ii)
sensors. The edge nodes have more storage capacity and
computational power compared to the sensors. The edge
nodes disseminate, verify (i.e., mining), and store blocks in
the blockchain, while the sensors can only send requests to
the edge devices for validation. Each node has private and
public keys to authenticate itself. A node has a unique hash
id that helps others to identify a node. Other nodes in the
network can verify the identity of a node (i.e., hash) by its
public key. Each node will earn an incentive after mining a
block. For simplicity, we assign one "coin" as an incentive
for mining a block.
Block. In a block, we store some essential elements in
addition to the typical components like other traditional
blockchains. A block consists of the previous parent block’s
hash (pHash), current hash (cHash), timestamp, timestamp
hash (tHash) to identify miner, transaction list (txnList), and
hash pointers of relocated nodes (rList) where a block is
relocated due to disk overload. Besides, each block keeps the
records of the creator node’s hash, pointers to the relocated
nodes where a node re-transfers a block during the data
dissemination phase, and the newly created hash of the block
in the individual re-located node. We will discuss the tasks
of the essential new elements in detail in Section 3.3.
Transactions. Sensors will generate data and upload it
as a transaction to the blockchain. The typical example of a
transaction is a fund transfer in mobile payment or business
data. In general, we have two types of transactions: (i) reg-
ular transactions, (ii) configuration transactions. Both edge
devices and sensors can issue regular transactions (e.g., fund
transfer). In contrast, the configuration transactions are only
issued by the edge nodes to control the different conditions
of the system, such as endorsement of new nodes, approval
for a transaction, or removing a dis-honest node from the
network. Both the regular and configuration transactions
will carry geographic information.
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Figure 2: Leader selection process by DEAN.
3.2 DEAN Components
In this section, we will explain the three parallel core ele-
ments of DEAN protocol, as shown in Figure 1, and then we
discuss the detailed workflow of the protocol in the following
section.
3.2.1 Build Initial Network. To avoid the problem in the
conventional leader selection process (i.e., proof-of-stake),
we introduce a technique "build-initial-network" in the DEAN
protocol that operates in the first phase. As shown in Figure 2,
in the first phase edge nodes participate in a small network to
find out the most trustworthy leaders among the edge nodes.
The initial participants are sorted based on (i) timestamp,
(ii) geographic information, and (iii) location. For this initial
verification of the trustworthiness, nodes need to share their
location and timestamp periodically. Therefore, if the initial
network size is large, then DEAN picks a few nodes based on
the combined score of the factors. During this phase, edge
nodes will exchange messages about the final decision about
the validity of a block. That is, an edge device validates a
block and shares the decision with the peers after validation.
A node includes the peer in the trusted adjacent node list if
it detects the same decision for the block.
The process of building the trusted adjacent list continues
till at-least a specific node creates more than 50% adjacency.
If at least one node attains majority trusts (i.e., 51% votes)
and meets the other leader selection criteria (i.e., Table 1), the
nodes stop to exchange messages and continue to the next
phase where the leader can approve any new transaction.
The adjacency list of a node is updated in the node’s global
account and shared among the peers. We will discuss this
phase in detail in Protocol 1. Once the leader is selected
during this initial phase, it (i.e., leader) also validates any new
nodes that request to join the network through a selection
procedure discussed in Protocol 3.
3.2.2 Consensus Mechanism. Due to the typical nature of
the consensus protocols (i.e., compute-intensive, communi-
cation-intensive, or Sybil attack due to initial token procure-
ment), the traditional blockchain systems are not directly
applicable in the resource-constrained edge computing envi-
ronment. Thus, we need to build a protocol that holds both
attributes: (i) reliability and (ii) scalability. The DEAN con-
sensus mechanism consists of two steps: (i) build an initial
network that finds most trustworthy nodes based on the
highest adjacency, (ii) select the leader node based on some
essential properties shown in Table 1 developed during the
Table 1: ATW Table Structure
Field Description
nodeID Unique identifier of a node
timestamp Timestamp logs of a node
geoTimer Geographic timer of a node’s activity
loc Location of a node
adj List of neighbour nodes
mList Total blocks mined by a node
bList Total blocks stored in a node
disk Free disk space in a node
first step. The properties such as weight of the adjacency list,
timestamp, and location help in determining the trustwor-
thiness(i.e., ATW score) of an edge device. Once the leader is
selected, they are solely responsible for mining new blocks.
The leader also provides pre-approval for the new nodes to
join the network.
Multiple leaders can get selected based on the same score
as shown in Figure 2. They can work in parallel to continue
validating separate sets of blocks. However, DEAN ensures
that no leader attempts to mine the same block based on a
locking mechanism on a block that ensures atomic operation.
Each block has a temporary hash built with the timestamp
assigned by a leader. Therefore, any node can verify who is
the first or original miner of the block from the temporary
hash. The consensus mechanism will be discussed in more
detail in Protocol 2.
3.2.3 Data Distribution. In a traditional blockchain sys-
tem, all the blocks are shared and replicated among all the
nodes in a network. Due to the storage constraint in the edge
devices, the traditional mechanism will be impractical to ap-
ply in edge computing. The blockchain data in edge devices
should be organized following a smart sharding mechanism
that allows storing blocks in a distributed manner among the
nodes with maximum adjacency that will allow: (i) in smart
data balancing and (ii) quick processing of any transaction
request. That is, replication process should be as much as
independent of the block validation process to accelerate the
quick processing of transaction.
The proposed data dissemination technique in the DEAN
protocol offers a practical approach tomanage the blockchain
data. First, it allows storing blocks only within the most trust-
worthy adjacent nodes of a leader. The same properties (i.e.,
adjacency list, timestamp) presented in Table 1 can deter-
mine the trustworthiness level of a node. Second, due to
storage limitation, if an edge device encounters disk over-
load, it further disseminates the oldest blocks to the fellow
nodes to get more space in the disk. We will discuss the data
dissemination technique in detail in Protocol 4.
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Protocol 1 Distributed-Network-Construction
Require: Ni the total initial edge nodes; b the new block;
Edge nodes E where the i-th node is Ei ; EiB the
blockchain copy on Ei ; EiN the adjacent list on E
i ; n
the new node; f the assumption of total faulty nodes.
Ensure: b is appended in 51% edge nodes after validating
with EB ’s and at-least an edge node E grows 51% adja-
ceny.
1: function Verify-Block(b, E, Ni )
2: for Ei ∈ E do
3: while lenдth(EiN ) <= Ni2 do
4: if Ei validates b & b < EiB then
5: EiB ← EiB ∪ b
6: Send block b to peers
7: end if
8: end while
9: end for
10: end function
11: function Build-Network(b, E j , Ni )
12: Ni ← 2f + 1
13: while lenдth(EiN ) <= Ni2 do
14: while block arrives from E j & EiN < E
j do
15: if Veri f ication Matches then
16: EiN ← EiN ∪ E j
17: end if
18: end while
19: end while
20: end function
3.3 Protocols
Our proposed consensus protocol, namely Decentralized-
Edge Autonomous Network (DEAN), which consists of four
sub-protocols. The first protocol, Distributed Network Con-
struction, aims to find leaders from the edge devices by de-
veloping maximum trustworthiness. The second protocol,
DEAN-Consensus, pushes leader nodes into the consensus:
whenever a new block arrives, the edge nodes (i.e., leaders)
with maximum adjacency (i.e., at least 51%) validates it. The
third protocol, New-Node-Approval, further extends the first
protocol that allows edge nodes to extend the blockchain
network by approving new nodes to join. Finally, the fourth
protocol, Memory-Balance assists with data distribution and
recovery in case of edge devices failure (e.g., storage overload,
power failure); hence, it helps in the successful continuation
of the block mining process.
Distributed-Network-Construction.The Protocol 1 ex-
plains how to build the very initial trustworthy network. In
essence, at the very early stage, a batch of new transactions
is packed into a block and eventually is propagated among
the edge nodes. As shown in Line 2, each node attempts
to validate and persist the block. After validation, the node
shares the decision with the peers (Line 6). In this phase,
each node acts as a sender and receiver. When a peer node
receives the decision (Line 14) and finds the same result with
its validation (Line 15), it adds the sender node into its adja-
cency list as a trusted peer, as shown in Line 16. This entire
process continues until a node reaches the minimum limit
(i.e., 51% adjacency). Once a node reaches the minimum limit,
it earns the pre-qualification to become a leader.
In our blockchain system, each node will have a ATW
Table 1 that is shared and updated among the peers periodi-
cally. The table holds the most recent status of the different
attributes (e.g., adjacency, timestamp, total mined blocks) of
a node. Therefore, if a node becomes trustworthy and gets
compromised at a certain point, the majority of the fellow
nodes already have the updated attributes that help in verify-
ing the messages sent from the compromised node. However,
if a node denies sharing its ATW table status with other
nodes within a fixed clock period, the node is broadcast as a
faulty one, and no further communication is allowed from it.
DEAN-Consensus. DEAN-Consensus is comprised of
two steps, as shown in Protocol 2. First, the nodes with max-
imum adjacency (i.e., at least 51%) will be chosen for the
leader selection competition, as shown in Line 2. Second,
the properties in Table 1 for each node will be computed to
sort the edge devices with the highest trustworthiness (Line
4). The node with the highest ATW value will be elected
as a leader (Line 6). The high ATW score indicates that the
node that achieves the highest adjacency, does not change
geographic location often, active for certain hours, and has a
certain amount of free disk space, can qualify to be a leader.
The leader earns the maximum trust from the peer nodes;
hence, it (i.e., leader) is allowed to validate any new block,
as shown in Line 17. The leader forwards the block to the
peers to replicate the copy after validation (Line 19).
If multiple edge devices achieve the same ATW score, the
systemwill have multiple leaders. Each leader can operate on
separate sets of blocks in parallel tomaximize the throughput.
However, it is important to track that multiple leaders are
not working on the same block. To avoid the collision, we
introduce a lock-based block assignment mechanism that
ensures no leader spends time on validating the same sets of
blocks. We generate a timestamp-based hash (i.e., tHash) for
a block once it is assigned to a leader. When an edge node
receives a block from a leader, it can validate the original
miner based on the timestamp hash (i.e., tHash).
The benefits of the new consensus protocol are four folds:
(i) It fastens the parallel block validation process through
multiple trusted leaders elected through at least 51% votes
(i.e., adjacency) in large scales of nodes, (ii) It makes the
validation process independent of the Build-Network phase
because the leaders can continue validating the blocks while
the other nodes are building the adjacency, (iii) More reliable
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Protocol 2 DEAN-Consensus
Require: Ni the total initial edge nodes; b the new block;
btHash the unique identifier of first miner of the block;
Edge nodes E where the i-th node is Ei ; Leader nodes
L where the i-th node is Eil ; E
i
B the blockchain copy on
Ei ; EiN the adjacent list on E
i ; Eiatw the ATW value of
Ei ;maxatw the maximum ATW value in a network.
Ensure: Multiple b’s are validated by Ei ’s holding largest
stake.
1: function Find-Leader(b, E, Ni )
2: while new block arrives & lenдth(EiN ) > Ni2 do
3: L ← ∅
4: Pick the node Ei with maximum ATW
5: maxatw ← Eiatw
6: L ← L ∪ Ei
7: while L is not ∅ do
8: L ← L − Eil ▷ lock the leader
9: Compute btHash
10: Call CONSENSUS(b,Eil )
11: end while
12: end while
13: end function
14: function Consensus(b, Eil )
15: Ei ← Eil
16: if Eiatw >=maxatw & b < EiB then
17: if Ei validates b then
18: EiB ← EiB ∪ b
19: Forward block to adjacent peers to replicate
20: L ← L ∪ Eil ▷ Release the leader
21: end if
22: end if
23: end function
data persistence is achieved by the agreement from the most
trustworthy edge nodes (i.e. leaders), and (iv) It opens the
road to reducing the network traffic across nodes in edge
computing because leader nodes store the blocks among the
nearby peers.
New-Node-Approval. Avoiding the unnecessary com-
munication overhead during the Build-Network, along with
the growth of the network, is a critical issue. In DEAN, we
propose a mechanism to address this point, as shown in Fig-
ure 3. Once the initial leaders are elected, during the very
first phase (i.e., Build-Network), the new nodes do not need to
communicate extensively with all the nodes to develop trust
(i.e., 51% adjacency). Instead, they can join the blockchain
network based on the vote from a leader as shown in Proto-
col 3. That is, new nodes will first try to achieve trust from
the leaders. As shown in Line 5, the new node will try first
to achieve the trust of a qualified leader before joining the
network. The leader forwards a block to the new node to
Protocol 3 New-Node-Approval
Require: Ni the total initial edge nodes; b the new block;
Edge nodes E where the i-th node is Ei ; EiB the
blockchain copy on Ei ; EiN the adjacent list on E
i ; n
the new node; ns the trustworthiness flag of new node;
nh the hash of new node.
Ensure: n is verified by leader nodes before it is added to
network.
1: function Join-NewNode(b, E, Ni , n)
2: ns ← False
3: for Ei ∈ E do
4: if ns is False then
5: if lenдth(EiN ) >= Ni2 then
6: n request a block b from Ei
7: if Ei verifies nh then
8: Ei forwards block b
9: if n validates b then
10: EiN ← EiN ∪ n
11: Ei earns joining fee from n
12: ns ← True ▷ Ei broadcasts n
13: end if
14: end if
15: end if
16: else
17: if Ei verifies nh then
18: EiN ← EiN ∪ n
19: end if
20: end if
21: end for
22: end function
Figure 3: New node approval process by DEAN.
verify (Line 8). The new node then shares the result with the
leader after validating the block. The leader approves the
node in the network if the result is valid (Line 10) and earns
a joining fee (Line 11).
The new node continues to grow its adjacency with all the
leaders eventually. As shown in Line 12, each leader broad-
casts the status of a new node, after verifying and adding it
to own adjacent list. When other edge devices find major-
ity votes from the leaders, they automatically add the new
nodes into their trusted adjacent list. However, the leader
pre-verifies the new node before it (i.e., leader) forwards a
block, as shown in Line 7.
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Protocol 4 Memory-Balance
Require: Edge nodes E where the i-th node is Ei ; Adjacent
nodes list Ea with available disk where the i-th node is
Eia ; EiB the blockchain copy on E
i ; Eidisk the disk space on
Ei ; EiBT the side blockchain of E
i ; Eibp the block pointer
to adjacent edge node; b the new block; bh the hash of
a block; bt the flag to decide block location; tbh the hash
pointer of adjacent edge node.
Ensure: Edge nodes Ei ’s share block with closest adjacent
nodes to save disk space.
1: function Dissemination(b, E)
2: if Eidisk >= 51% then
3: A← closest neighbours with available disk
4: while A is not ∅ do
5: bt ← True ▷ Block for side chain
6: if E j < Ea then ▷ Not in adjacent nodes
7: tbh ← RECEIVEBLOCK(b,E j )
8: if tbh is valid then
9: Eibp ← tbh ▷ Keep pointer
10: Empty the data from block b
11: Split rewards with E j
12: end if
13: end if
14: A← A − E j
15: end while
16: end if
17: end function
18: function ReceiveBlock(b, E j )
19: while Block b arrives do
20: if bt is True then
21: if b < E jBT then
22: if bh confirms source then
23: Compute tbh
24: E jBT ← E jBT ∪ b ▷ Add to side chain
25: Return tbh
26: end if
27: end if
28: end if
29: end while
30: end function
Data Distribution and Recovery. We explain the pro-
cess of data dissemination and recovery in case of disk over-
load in a node in Protocol 4. As shown in Line 2, an edge
node can start disseminating the oldest blocks to nearby fel-
low nodes if the disk space is occupied by 51%. It should be
noted that at the early stage (i.e., Protocol 2), after validating
a block, each leader stores the hash pointers (i.e., rList) of
adjacent nodes before disseminating the block to the fellow
nodes. Therefore, to disseminate the old blocks, the edge
nodes select only those fellow nodes that are not available
in the rList, as shown in Line 6. The sender node sets the
block relocation flag before disseminating (Line 5) to distin-
guish between a regular block and an old block. The receiver
node will double-check first if the block is sent for reloca-
tion purposes (Line 20) and is not already stored in the local
blockchain (Line 21). Before storing the block in the disk,
the receiver node will first verify the source node’s hash, as
shown in Line 22. If the hash is valid, the node will compute
a new hash (i.e., thb )) (Line 23) for the relocated block and
store it (i.e., block) with the current hash (i.e., cHash).
We use a secured side chain in each node to store the
relocated blocks to keep them separate from the regular (i.e.,
already mined) blocks. The blocks in a side chain can always
be verified from the rList stored in the source node’s hollow
block. The node will store the relocated block in a side chain
(Line 24) before responding to the sender node (Line 25)
with the new relocated hash (i.e., thb )). The sender node will
store the new hash in the block’s relocation hash pointer
list (i.e.rList), as shown in Line 9. Finally, the sender node
prepares a hollow block case for the transferred block. That
is, it (i.e., sender) keeps only all the hash values of the block
for future quick data recovery purposes and erases the data
content from the disk to make more space (Line 10). As the
receiver node helps in relocating the block, it will split the
reward for the block with the sender node, as shown in Line
11.
3.4 Safety
This section theoretically proves the safety of the DEAN
protocol; that is, the entire system will keep intact if more
than 50% edge nodes are not compromised. This is because, as
long as at least 51% nodes are not compromised, the leaders
are not compromised. In other words, the DEAN protocol
guarantees at least 51% nodes reach consensus. It should be
noted that the protocol works against only Byzantine faults;
the fail-stop model is beyond the discussion of this paper.
Theorem 3.1 (Safety of DEAN). Guarantee of at least
51% nodes reach consensus.
If a |M |-edge-sensor network is reliable to up to |M |2 com-
promised nodes, then the extended (|M | + |L|)-node network
with |L| leader nodes (|L| ≤ |M | and at least
( |M |
2 + 1
)
M are
connected to L), is also reliable to up to |M |+ |L |2 compromised
nodes if all nodes follow the DEAN protocol.
Proof. We will prove this by contradiction. That is, we
assume there were F =
( |M |+ |L |
2 + 1
)
compromised nodes in
the extended (|M | + |L|)-node network in the following. We
will show that this assumption will lead to a contradiction
to the conditions and assumptions stated by the theorem.
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Because there are at most Fm = |M |2 compromised nodes
from the original |M |-edge-sensor network as leader |L| is
selected based on at least
( |M |
2 + 1
)
votes from edge nodes,
at least Fs = F − Fm =
( |L |
2 + 1
)
compromised nodes have
to come from L. According to Line 2 in Protocol 2, there
must be at least
( |M |
2 + 1
)
clusters of edge nodes that have
been compromised. According to the assumption that at
least 51% edge nodes are connected to each leader node |L|,
every cluster comprises |M ||L | edge nodes on average. As a
consequence, there must be at least F ∗m compromised edge
nodes, where
F ∗m =
|M |
|L| ·
( |L|
2 + 1
)
=
|M |
2 +
|M |
|L|
Note that the theorem assumes that the number of edge
leaders is always smaller than that of edge nodes, i.e., |L| ≤
|M |. Therefore, we have F ∗m ≥ |M |2 +1. However, the theorem
also states that the original |M |-edge-sensor network cannot
have more than Fm ≤ |M |2 compromised nodes, as leader |L|
is selected based on
( |M |
2 + 1
)
votes. Therefore, the fact that
we conclude with F ∗m > Fm leads to a contradiction. □
3.5 Liveness
This section explains in details why DEAN protocol is non-
blocking. That is, no fail-restart nodes would block the ex-
ecution of the voting procedure. In other words, as long as
the failed nodes can eventually recover (even in a different
state than where it fails), the consensus is either reached or
cancelled: there is no “partial consensus”. In the context of
transactions, it is also referred to as commit and abort. As
demonstrated in [25], there are two necessary and sufficient
conditions to ensure a non-blocking protocol:
C1 There is no such a state from which we can make a
decision between commit and abort.
C2 There is no direct link between an undeterministic4
state and a commit state.
To see how C1 is satisfied, let’s assume the leader node P
who initiates and validates the transaction fails after (m − 1)
adjacent nodes have validated P ’s request. That is, totalm
nodes, including P itself, have verified the transaction before
P is failed and restarted. There are two scenarios to consider:
• Ifm <= N2 , then P is locked and can not start new
transaction processing until it finishes transferring
the transaction to adjacent nodes (i.e., at least N2 + 1)
according to Line 19 of Protocol 2. In other words,
the state always indicates an abort, and the restarted
4An undeterministic state is defined as a state from which no final decision
can be made.
P node will simply resend the transaction to other
nodes to verify and vote.
• Ifm >= N2 + 1, then lock on P is released and should
have persisted the change to the disk according to
Line 20 of Protocol 2. In this case, when P restarts, it
will lead to a commit status for sure.
Therefore, we see that no matter how many nodes have
verified the transactions requested by P before the latter fails,
for each possible case there is only one possible outcome.
That is, we never need to decide a commit or abort operation
given a specific case. C1 is thus satisfied.
It is straightforward to verify C2 because DEAN does not
exhibit an undeterministic state. Once P restarts, it simply
checks whether the persistent storage has the transaction
written. If so, P will mark the transaction completed—a “com-
mit” state; otherwise, P will restart the mining procedure
and resend everything—an “abort” state. C2 is thus satisfied.
4 EVALUATION
4.1 Experimental Setup
We have implemented a prototype system of the proposed
DEAN blockchain architecture and consensus protocols with
Python and deployed to a Mac workstation with Intel Core-i7
4.2 GHz CPUs along with 32 GB 2400 MHz DDR4 memory.
We simulate multiple nodes with Docker [26] that supports
creating multiple nodes distributedly. Most of the experi-
ments were carried out on 100 nodes while the largest scale
is up to 1,000 nodes. The ratio between edge and sensor
nodes is set to 1:3 by default, i.e., |S ||M | = 3. We assume all
nodes are distributed in an area of 600m × 600m to 6000m ×
6000m based on different scales. The main workload under
evaluation comprises 2.8 million queries similar to YCSB [27].
YCSB is widely accepted in measuring the performance of
blockchain systems (e.g., BlockBench [24]).
4.2 Resilience
This section demonstrates that consensus can be reached by
the proposed protocol. Note that, we have proven its safety
in Section 3.4; we hereby experimentally verify the conclu-
sion in real-world applications. The approach we take is to
feed the system with a large number of random transactions
extracted from YCSB [27] and let the system run for 180
minutes in a 1000-node cluster. We repeated the experiments
for 6 times. During each experiment we randomly turn off
a number of edge nodes, assuming the turned off nodes are
malicious.
We report the results in Figure 4, which shows that more
than 60% nodes hold valid blockchains even with 25% node
failures. Note that, by definition, a consensus is reached by
having more than 50% of nodes holding valid blockchains.
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Figure 4: DEAN’s Resilience. DEAN guarantees that
more than 50% of nodes hold valid blockchain in prac-
tice.
This experiment demonstrates that the real quorum in prac-
tice is far more than 50%. Therefore, in our earlier proof 3.4,
the lower bound 50% could have been elevated. Since we are
interested in only the safety of the protocol at this point, it is
sufficient to show that 50% quorum is reached—finding out
the minimal quorum (possibly higher than 50%) is beyond
the scope of this paper. This result, however, suggests that
we might be able to further trade the additional 10% quorum
for even higher performance.
Another important phenomenon is that a larger portion
(67%) of nodes hold the correct chain. We did not conduct
any theoretical analysis on how many nodes could achieve
unanimous agreement (i.e., 100% agreement); however, this
experiment demonstrates that a significant portion (67% in
this case) of nodes might not experience the so-called “di-
vergence” problem—referring to that subsets of nodes (less
than 50%) not holding the valid blockchain. Therefore, there
might be some room in the DEAN protocol to further relax
the constraints, possibly leading to higher performance.
4.3 Throughput
We report the throughput of the DEAN-based blockchain sys-
tem prototype and compare its performance to other leading
blockchain systems: Ethereum [16], Parity [17] and Hyper-
ledger [18]. We measure the performance of DEAN on up
to 32 nodes (the ratio of edge and sensor nodes is 1:3) over
the period of five minutes, where each senor node issues up
to 10,000 queries per second and each block contains more
than 12 transactions. The workload is similar to [27] used
for other blockchain systems [24].
Figure 5 reports that DEAN-based system outperforms all
other systems in terms of the throughput. DEAN provides up
to 88.8×, 16.6× and 6.7× more throughput compared to Par-
ity, Ethereum and Hyperledger, respectively. Although both
DEAN and Ethereum are derived from PoW, DEAN exhibits
significantly higher throughput because it could shorten the
puzzle-solving time without compromising the security guar-
anteed by the protocol, which exploits the unique property
in edge computing where edge nodes are highly reliable.
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Figure 5: Throughput Comparison between DEAN
and state-of-the-art blockchain systems. DEAN out-
performs major blockchain systems with orders of
magnitude higher throughput.
Hyperledger delivers much higher throughput than Parity
because Hyperledger is not based on PoW, but relies on
leader selection protocol (practical Byzantine fault tolerance,
PBFT), whose bottleneck lies on the network rather than
the computing time. That is also why Hyperledger shows a
poor scalability in literature [24] (usually not scalable beyond
tens of nodes). DEAN, in contrast, not only achieves higher
throughput than Hyperledger (thanks to the low-difficulty
computation time), but also scales the throughput beyond
16 nodes—the known limit for Hyperledger [24].
Parity delivers the lowest throughput among the four sys-
tems under comparison. Parity’s consensus is based on a
simplified version of Proof-of-Stake (PoS), which is obvi-
ously inappropriate to edge computing because it is difficult
to estimate the “stake” of the edge and sensor nodes as they
may come and go at arbitrary times. Performance-wise, this
experiment suggests that DEAN is a preferable protocol for
edge sensors and edge computing applications.
4.4 Latency
Similarly to the previous section, we compare DEAN’s la-
tency with Ethereum, Parity, and Hyperledger, respectively.
The latency here in this context refers to the latency from the
perspective of the entire blockchain system, rather than the
conventional per-block latency. The latter is less interesting
in this context because per-block performance is insufficient
to fully describe the performance characteristic of the entire
blockchain system, whereas the aggregate block-appending
time represents the system latency as a whole.
As shown in Figure 6, DEAN incurs the lowest latency
when appending various numbers of blocks ranging from one
to 10,000. In particular, for appending 10,000 blocks, DEAN
takes only 0.5 second while Ethereum takes 13 seconds, lead-
ing to 26× speedup; DEAN is also at least 10× faster than
both Parity and Hyperledger.
It should be noted that in DEAN all the blocks contain
more than 12 transactions, whereas each block generated in
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Figure 6: Latency Comparison between DEAN and
state-of-the-art blockchain systems. DEAN is orders
of magnitude faster than others and incurs only sub-
second for adding 10,000 blocks.
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Figure 7: Scalability of DEAN’s Processing Time.
DEAN takes less than five seconds for appending a
new block on extreme scales of 1,000 nodes.
the experiments demonstrated at [24] contains only three
transactions. Therefore, if we reduce the workload of DEAN,
the latency gap would have been larger. In our current im-
plementation of DEAN’s system prototype, the number of
transactions per block is hard-coded. Future releases will
allow users to adjust the transaction density—the maximal
number of transactions allowed in a single block (as long as
size allows).
4.5 Scalability
In this section, we report DEAN’s performance at various
scales on up to 1,000 nodes. To the best of our knowledge,
little literature exists for the mainstream blockchain systems
and protocols at such scales. In fact, it is well-accepted that
existing PoW, PoS, and PBFT blockchain protocols are not
scalable [23]. For this reason, we did not compare DEAN to
other blockchains in terms of scalability.
Figure 7 reports the time taken by DEAN for processing
a single block at different scales ranging from 100 to 1,000
nodes. On 100 nodes, DEAN needs less than one millisecond
for processing a block. On 1,000 nodes, the protocol can still
deliver a new block within five seconds. Note that in our
experimental setup each block comprises 12 transactions,
implying that the overall system is able to process multiple
transactions each second, which is on par with the largest
production blockchain system Bitcoin [14]. Indeed, Bitcoin
consists of about 10,000 nodes globally [28], much more than
the scale we are experimenting here. However, we argue that
for edge computing applications where wireless networks
are the norm and the performance bottleneck, 1,000 nodes
are more than enough for edge computing applications to
saturate the hardware resources as reported in [11]. While
the next-generation high-performance wireless network, e.g.,
5G network, is being widely deployed, the network’s lim-
itation will be somewhat relaxed and then the bottleneck
will likely come back to the node scalability. For that reason,
we believe further scaling the number of nodes will be an
important research question to be addressed in our future
work.
We also compare the block processing time with a recent
IoT blockchain system [19] that operates on a very small
scale (i.e., 50 nodes). We observe that at a 50-node scale
the protocol [19] requires almost 3 seconds, whereas at a
100-node scale our proposed DEAN protocol requires less
than a quarter second. The reason behind the notable per-
formance degradation in [19] is, the protocol requires a pre-
computation of block allocation prior to each block mining
process that consumes a significant amount of processing
time. In contrast, the block dissemination mechanism pro-
posed in DEAN is totally independent of the mining process.
4.6 Sensitivity
All experiments thus far discussed assume the ratio between
sensor nodes and storage nodes is 1:3, where each storage
node is connected by three sensor nodes and all storage
nodes are connected with a full mesh network. It is a natural
question to ask how, if at all, the ratio would impact the
performance of DEAN. The correctness of DEAN is out of
the question regarding the ratios as long as the ratio M is
larger than one. Therefore, the remainder of this section will
evaluate the impact of different sensor:storage ratios.
We vary the ratios between sensor and storage nodes as
1:2, 1:3, 1:4. and 1:5, and report the respective throughput
and latency at different scales from 100 to 1,000 nodes. More
sensor nodes generate more transaction requests. Ideally, the
performance (both throughput and latency) should be stable
with little impact from the ratios—implying a strong stabil-
ity of the proposed consensus and system implementation.
Finding out the optimal ratio is part of the parameter tuning
procedure and is beyond the scope of this paper. In addition,
extreme large ratios (e.g., 1:100 or more) is not the norm of
today’s real systems [11] and thus will be investigated in our
future work.
Figure 8 reports the throughput on different scale of nodes.
There is no noticeable difference between the ratios under
consideration and there is not clear winner at all scales. For
instance, although 1:2 seems to outperform others at the
largest scale of 1,000 nodes, there is no consistent pattern
to support the argument that a smaller sensor:storage ratio
leads to a higher throughput.
11
10
100
1000
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
Th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 (Q
ue
rie
s 
pe
r S
ec
on
d)
Number of Nodes
1:2 1:3 1:4 1:5
Figure 8: DEAN’s Throughput with Various Distribu-
tions of Sensor and Storage Nodes. No noticeable dif-
ference is found with different ratios between storage
and sensor nodes.
In contrast to performance, we do observe a smoother
trend for larger sensor:storage ratios. To see this, the 1:5 plot
is clearly following a more linear path than 1:2 and 1:3. This
phenomenon can be best explained by the discrepant hard-
ware specification in the edge computing network: the net-
work connecting sensor nodes and their storage node usually
delivers high performance than the network infrastructure
within the storage nodes. Therefore, with more sensor nodes,
the heterogeneity embedded in the edge network is actually
reduced, thus rendering a smoother trend in the plot. In the
extreme case, if the number of storage nodes is negligible,
then the network would look like a homogeneous one with
only sensor nodes and the performance should be linearly
impacted by the number of nodes.
In Figure 9, we compare the latency incurred by different
sensor:storage ratios. Similarly to throughput, latency does
not seem impacted much by varying the ratios, and a smaller
ratio exhibits more zigzags than larger ratios due to the same
reasons discussed before: with more sensor nodes in the
network, the entire system works more like a homogeneous
system exhibiting a smoother curve in the performance plot.
To summarize, from both Figure 8 and Figure 9, we can
draw a conclusion that with the increment of transaction re-
quests from sensors, the proposed DEAN protocol is reliable
enough in consistent block processing.
5 MORE RELATEDWORK
Researchers are continually studying ways of transforming
the traditional approaches used in edge computing. For in-
stance, Song et al. [29] proposed Peer Data Sharing (PDS)
that enables edge devices to quickly discover which data
exist in nearby peers and retrieve interested data robustly
and efficiently. In [3], a hybrid framework was proposed to
address the task allocation problem for delay-sensitive social
sensing applications in edge computing. Xie et al. [30] pro-
posed a data indexing mechanism called COordinate-based
INdexing (COIN) for the data sharing in the edge computing
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Figure 9: DEAN’s Latency with Various Distributions
of Sensor and Storage Nodes. No noticeable difference
is foundwith different ratios between storage and sen-
sor nodes.
environment. In [31], two caching algorithms were proposed
to achieve fair workload among selected caching nodes for
data sharing in pervasive edge environments. A new opti-
mization framework called MobiQoR was proposed in [32]
to minimize service response time and energy consumption
by jointly optimizing the Quality of Result (QoR) of all edge
nodes and the offloading strategy. Also, OREO, an efficient
online algorithm was proposed in [33] that jointly optimizes
dynamic service caching and task offloading to address sev-
eral key challenges in mobile edge computing systems, in-
cluding service heterogeneity, unknown system dynamics,
spatial demand coupling and decentralized coordination.
In addition, the well-known consensus protocols in block-
chain includes proof-of-work (PoW), proof-of-stake (PoS)
and practical byzantine fault tolerance (PBFT). Furthermore,
there exists other consensus protocols [34–36] developed as
an extension of this pioneering protocols with the aim of
improving and overcoming their drawbacks. A detailed com-
parison and history of blockchain consensus mechanisms
can be found in [37]. As discussed in [38], future edge com-
puting and IoT systems need decentralized trust and this
paper represents one early study toward decentralized ar-
chitecture with according protocols for data integrity in edge
computing.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper presents the DEAN consensus protocol to achieve
high data fidelity under resource constraints in edge comput-
ing. The key idea of DEAN is partly enlightened by blockchains,
and its safety is both theoretically proven and experimental
verified on a system prototype. In addition to the improved
data fidelity, the system prototype also delivers significantly
higher performance than the state-of-the-art alternatives
thanks to DEAN’s unique design on smart load-balancing
both on computation and storage.
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